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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Justice Stevens once described the Internet with its many attributes as 
a “unique medium—known to its users as ‘cyberspace’—located in no 
particular geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in the 
world, with access to [it].”1  A vast array of interconnected computers,2 
 
 *  J.D. 2001, University of San Diego School of Law; B.A. History 1992, 
University of Florida.  The author would like to thank Mike, Chris, and Kate for their 
continuing love and understanding throughout her academic career. 
 1. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997). 
 2. Due to the nature of the beast, it is difficult, if not impossible, to say with any 
accuracy just how many people or computers are online.  Indeed, “[t]he art of estimating 
how many are online throughout the world is an inexact one at best.”  Nua Internet 
Surveys, How Many Online?, at http://www.nua.ie/surveys/how_many_online/index. 
html (last visited Apr. 21, 2002).  A February 2002 “guesstimate” by Nua put the number 
at 544.2 million users worldwide.  Id.  In the United States alone, Nua estimates that 
there are approximately 164.1 million users, almost sixty percent of the population.  Nua 
Internet Surveys, U.S. & Canada, at http://www.nua.ie/surveys/how_many_online/n_ 
america.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2002). 
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the Internet is incapable of precise geographic definition.  Indeed, “[t]he 
Internet has no territorial boundaries. . . .  [A]s far as the Internet is 
concerned, not only is there perhaps ‘no there there,’ the ‘there’ is 
everywhere where there is Internet access.”3  In a world where legal 
boundaries are often defined by physical ones, courts are increasingly 
faced with the challenge of applying traditional rules to new and unique 
technologies.  For example, courts have recently been forced to grapple 
with the following question: when may a court exercise jurisdiction over 
a nonresident defendant based on his Internet contacts?4 
In August 2001, a California court addressed this issue for the first 
time in Pavlovich v. Superior Court,5 when a Web site operator, 
Matthew Pavlovich, sought to quash service of process on the basis of 
lack of jurisdiction.6  Despite the apparent lack of any contacts with the 
State of California,7 the court held that exercise of personal jurisdiction 
was supported by minimum contacts.8 
This Casenote questions the Pavlovich court’s holding.9  More 
 
 3. Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 462 (D. Mass. 
1997). 
 4. See, e.g., GTE New Media Servs. Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343 (D.C. 
Cir. 2000); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997); Bensusan 
Rest. Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 
952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997); see also Jeremy Gilman, Personal Jurisdiction and 
the Internet: Traditional Jurisprudence for a New Medium, 56 BUS. LAW. 395 (2000) 
(surveying recent Internet personal jurisdiction cases); James A. Huizanga & John K. 
VanDeWeert, Personal Jurisdiction over Internet Defendants, in PRACTISING LAW INST., 
CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES NO. 1241: CONSUMER 
FINANCIAL SERVICES LITIGATION 11 (2001) (surveying cases dealing with the issue of 
personal jurisdiction and Internet defendants), available at WL 1241 PLI/CORP 11. 
 5. 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909 (Ct. App. 2001), reh’g granted, Pavlovich v. Superior 
Court, 36 P.3d 625 (Cal. 2001).  In December 2001 the California Supreme Court 
granted review of the Sixth District Court of Appeal’s decision.  This Casenote suggests 
that the jurisdictional analysis in Pavlovich is flawed and that the supreme court should 
take this opportunity not only to overrule the lower court’s decision, but also to set forth 
the appropriate guidelines for Internet jurisdiction under California law. 
 6. Id. at 911. 
 7. See infra notes 38–40 and accompanying text. 
 8. Pavlovich, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 916. 
 9. This Casenote is meant as a critique of one Internet jurisdiction case, 
Pavlovich v. Superior Court.  Id.  It is not meant to be an extensive commentary on the 
issue of personal jurisdiction and the Internet.  Furthermore, it does not seek to answer 
the difficult question of when the exercise of jurisdiction over an Internet defendant is 
reasonable; that subject is beyond the scope of this Casenote.  For more on Internet 
jurisdiction, see generally Joseph S. Burns & Richard A. Bales, Personal Jurisdiction 
and the Web, 53 ME. L. REV. 29 (2001) (examining ways that courts have tried to resolve 
personal jurisdiction issues based on Internet activity); Martin H. Redish, Of New Wine 
and Old Bottles: Personal Jurisdiction, the Internet, and the Nature of Constitutional 
Evolution, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 575, 609 (1998) (positing that personal jurisdiction 
inquiries related to the Internet should be based on state interests and procedural 
fairness); Katherine C. Sheehan, Predicting the Future: Personal Jurisdiction for the 
Twenty-First Century, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 385, 438–40 (1998) (suggesting that courts 
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specifically, it argues that the exercise of personal jurisdiction in this 
case violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and that the court erred when it failed to 
quash service of process.  Further, this Casenote posits that exercise of 
jurisdiction here not only eviscerates the mandates of International Shoe 
Co. v. Washington10 and its progeny, but also extends California 
jurisdiction to cover Internet users everywhere. 
II.  PERSONAL JURISDICTION: AN OVERVIEW 
Personal jurisdiction is one of the cornerstones of the American legal 
system, and the initial concern in most cases, for if a court cannot 
exercise jurisdiction over the defendant, a case cannot go forward.11  
Personal jurisdiction concerns a court’s ability to exercise power over a 
nonresident defendant.12  Absent personal jurisdiction, a nonresident 
defendant cannot be haled into a foreign court and forced to defend an 
action.13 
Personal jurisdiction is a constitutional requirement, flowing from the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution which forbids “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”14  The Due Process Clause seeks 
 
should focus more on the burden of defending suits in distant forums and on 
foreseeability of suit in that forum); Adam Cizek, Comment, Traditional Personal 
Jurisdiction and the Internet: Does It Work?, 7 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 109 (1999) 
(addressing whether questions of jurisdiction and the Internet are amenable to the 
traditional analysis); Richard Philip Rollo, Casenote, The Morass of Internet Personal 
Jurisdiction: It Is Time for a Paradigm Shift, 51 FLA. L. REV. 667 (1999) (discussing the 
current approaches to personal jurisdiction over Internet defendants). 
 10. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 11. This Casenote is not meant to serve as an exhaustive dissertation on the law of 
personal jurisdiction.  Instead, it provides a brief overview as background.  For a more 
thorough treatment of personal jurisdiction, see generally ROBERT C. CASAD, 
JURISDICTION AND FORUM SELECTION (2d ed. 2001); JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL 
PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1999); JOSEPH W. GLANNON, CIVIL PROCEDURE: EXAMPLES AND 
EXPLANATIONS 26 (3d ed. 1997). 
 12. For purposes of this Casenote, the discussion of personal jurisdiction is limited 
to nonresident defendants.  If the defendant is a resident of a state or domiciled therein, 
the state may exercise jurisdiction over him.  See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463–
64 (1940). 
 13. See infra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  Personal jurisdiction has both statutory and 
constitutional limits.  Therefore, every personal jurisdiction inquiry necessarily requires 
that two questions be answered.  First, is the court statutorily authorized to exercise 
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant?  Second, if there is a state statute, is the 
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to ensure “that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum 
State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court 
there.”15 
Thus, a court may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if 
“he [has] certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice.’”16  Due Process is satisfied when two criteria are 
satisfied—first, the defendant has certain minimum contacts with the 
forum, and second, the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable and does 
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.17 
As stated, the threshold question for personal jurisdiction is whether 
the defendant had contacts with the forum state.  The nature and quantity 
 
exercise of personal jurisdiction constitutional according to the facts of the case?  Courts 
may not exercise jurisdiction over a person unless they have been empowered to do so.  
The legislature of each state must grant its courts power to exercise jurisdiction.  Where, 
as here, a state wants to exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, it will 
generally enact a “long arm statute.”  In California, courts are authorized to “exercise 
jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of [California] or of the 
United States.”  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 2000).  Consequently, in 
California, personal jurisdiction inquiries are, in essence, collapsed into one question: is 
the court’s exercise of jurisdiction constitutional?  See Sibley v. Superior Court, 546 P.2d 
322, 324 (Cal. 1976) (“This section [410.10] manifests an intent to exercise the broadest 
possible jurisdiction, limited only by constitutional considerations.”). 
 15. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) 
(stating further that the Due Process Clause “gives a degree of predictability to the legal 
system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some 
minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit”). 
 16. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. 
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).  International Shoe signaled a significant turning 
point in personal jurisdiction analysis.  Prior to the landmark case, actual physical 
presence of the defendant in the forum was required.  See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 
733–34 (1877).  Physical presence remains a constitutional basis for exercising 
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant; thus, if a nonresident defendant is present in 
the forum state, he may be “tagged” and forced to defend a suit there.  See Burnham v. 
Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610–12 (1990). 
Ostensibly wishing to base their exercise of personal jurisdiction on physical presence, 
the Pavlovich court stated: 
Instant access provided by the Internet is the functional equivalent of personal 
presence of the person posting the material on the Web at the place from which 
the posted material is accessed and appropriated.  It is as if the poster is 
instantaneously present in different places at the same time, and 
simultaneously delivering his material at those different places.  In a sense, 
therefore, the reach of the Internet is also the reach of the extension of the 
poster’s presence. 
Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 916 (Ct. App. 2001), reh’g granted, 
Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 36 P.3d 625 (Cal. 2001).  One can only guess what the 
court was getting at.  Apparently the court realized the folly of this line of reasoning and 
quickly abandoned it.  
 17. The issue may be analyzed in the following two steps: (1) are there minimum 
contacts, and (2) if so, is the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable?  See Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474–76 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 286. 
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of the contacts will determine whether the court may exercise either 
general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction over the nonresident 
defendant.18  Where the defendant’s contacts with the forum are 
continuous and systematic, the court may exercise general jurisdiction 
over the defendant for lawsuits wholly unrelated to the forum contacts.19  
In other words, the defendant may be haled into the forum court to 
answer for any matter, whether or not it relates to his contacts in the 
state.20 
Where, as in the case at hand,21 a defendant’s contacts with the forum 
are not continuous and systematic, then the court may not exercise 
general jurisdiction over the defendant.  In this situation, the court must 
determine whether the defendant’s contacts are of sufficient nature and 
quality to establish specific jurisdiction, whereby the defendant may be 
haled into the forum court to answer only for claims arising out of or 
related to those contacts.22 
Recall that the Due Process Clause requires that the defendant “should 
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”23  For this reason, a 
defendant may not be forced to defend a suit arising out of random, 
fortuitous, or attenuated contacts, nor will a defendant be forced to defend 
a suit arising out of the unilateral activity of another.24  Where, however, 
the defendant has “‘purposefully directed’ his activities at residents of the 
forum”25 or “purposefully avail[ed himself] of the privilege of conducting 
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and 
 
 18. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415–16 
(1984) (approving of and adopting the distinction between general and specific 
jurisdiction). 
 19. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318 (discussing the concept of general 
jurisdiction); see also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, 466 U.S. at 414.  For more 
on general jurisdiction, see B. Glenn George, In Search of General Jurisdiction, 64 TUL. 
L. REV. 1097 (1990); Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 610 (1988).  Note that in the case at hand, Pavlovich’s contacts with California 
were anything but continuous and systematic.  See infra notes 38–40 and accompanying 
text. 
 20. Note that if the lawsuit does not arise out of the contacts, the court will 
exercise general jurisdiction over the defendant; on the other hand, if the lawsuit does 
arise out of the defendant’s contacts, then the court will exercise specific jurisdiction 
over the defendant.  See infra notes 22–26 and accompanying text.  To the defendant, the 
distinction is, arguably, irrelevant.  Either way, he is forced to defend the suit. 
 21. See infra notes 36–38 and accompanying text. 
 22. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, 466 U.S. at 414. 
 23. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). 
 24. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985). 
 25. Id. at 472 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)). 
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protections of its laws,”26 exercise of specific jurisdiction is permissible. 
As noted, the threshold question for personal jurisdiction is whether 
the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state.27  In addition, 
the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with “traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice.”28  Thus, where minimum contacts exist, an 
exercise of personal jurisdiction may still be impermissible if it is 
unreasonable or unfair.29  Reasonableness is assessed by weighing 
several factors, including “‘the burden on the defendant,’ ‘the forum 
State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute,’ ‘the plaintiff’s interest in 
obtaining convenient and effective relief,’ ‘the interstate judicial 
system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of 
controversies,’ and the ‘shared interest of the several States in furthering 
fundamental substantive social policies.’”30 
In summary, specific personal jurisdiction is permissible if the 
following three criteria are satisfied: (1) the defendant must have 
purposefully directed his activities at the forum or purposefully availed 
himself of the privilege of doing business in the forum, (2) the suit must 
arise out of or relate to those activities, and (3) the exercise of 
jurisdiction must be reasonable. 
III.  THE PAVLOVICH DECISION 
A.  The Factual Background 
On December 27, 1999, DVD Copy Control Association (DVD CCA) 
sued Matthew Pavlovich for misappropriation of trade secrets.31  While a 
computer engineering student at Purdue University, Matthew Pavlovich, 
along with several other defendants, “developed and/or posted computer 
programs on the Internet.”32  One of the programs posted by Pavlovich 
was DeCSS—a program designed to decrypt DVD CCA’s Content 
 
 26. Id. at 475 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). 
 27. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 28. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940); see also supra note 16 and 
accompanying text. 
 29. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987) 
(striking down exercise of jurisdiction as unreasonable, despite being unable to reach a 
majority on the question of minimum contacts).  In California, once minimum contacts 
have been established, the court will presume that the exercise of jurisdiction is 
reasonable.  See Vons Cos. v. Seabest Foods, Inc., 926 P.2d 1085, 1094 (Cal. 1996).  At 
that point, the defendant bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction is unreasonable.  Id. 
 30. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)). 
 31. Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 911 (Ct. App. 2001), reh’g 
granted, Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 36 P.3d 625 (Cal. 2001). 
 32. Id. 
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Scramble System (CSS), which prevents DVDs from being copied.33  
DeCSS was developed by reverse engineering CCS algorithms,34 which 
DVD CCA alleged constituted a misappropriation of its trade secrets.35  
The program itself was not written or published by Pavlovich; however, 
he was aware of the reverse engineering and knew it was unauthorized.36  
Despite this knowledge, Pavlovich posted DeCSS to the Internet, 
thereby disseminating DVD CCA’s trade secrets.37 
At the time Pavlovich posted DeCSS to the Internet, he was a student 
at Purdue University in Indiana.38  He did not live or work in California.39  
Furthermore, he “never: solicited business in California; designated a 
registered agent for service of process in California; maintained a place 
of business in California . . . or even visited California for any business 
purpose.”40  In short, Pavlovich himself had no connection to California. 
 
 33. Id.  The Content Scramble System is used to protect copyrighted material on 
DVDs.  In other words, if a DVD contains a movie, which is copyrighted material, the 
Content Scramble System prevents the copying of that movie.  See id.  DeCSS was 
created and originally posted to the Internet by a Norwegian teenager.  See DVD Group 
Must Show Why Jurisdiction Exists Over Defendant in DeCSS Case, 2 ANDREWS E-BUS. 
L. BULL., Feb. 2001, at 1, WL 2 No. 4 ANEBUSLB 1. 
 34. Pavlovich, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 912. 
 35. Id.  Note that California law specifically permits reverse engineering.  CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 3426.1(a) (West 1997).  However, DVD CCA argued that because use of 
their software was subject to an agreement not to reverse engineer it, doing so 
constituted a misappropriation of trade secrets.  See Evan Hansen, Hollywood Dealt 
Setback in DVD Code Case, CNET NEWS.COM, Dec. 14, 2000, at 
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-249956.html?legacy=cnet. 
 36. Pavlovich, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 912.  In a deposition, Pavlovich stated: 
They had to reverse engineer those algorithms in order to mimic them.  Like 
just kind of quick once over, when you are reverse engineering something, you 
see what goes in and what comes out, and if you don’t have access to that 
information, what one would do is try to mimic those, so they wouldn’t 
necessarily be the exact algorithms, but if you can get as close or if you can get 
the correct results, then the engineering—reverse engineering process can be 
deemed a success. 
Id. 
 37. Id.  Pavlovich posted the program on a Web site called “livid.on. 
openprojects.net.”  Id.  According to the court, Pavlovich owned and operated this site.  
Id.  Pavlovich maintained that he did not own it, but did concede that he posted DeCSS 
on it.  Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Petition for Writ of 
Mandate, Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909 (Ct. App. 2001) (No. CV 
786804), available at http://cryptome.org/dvd-v-521-pqa.htm [hereinafter Points and 
Authorities].  Though not addressed in the opinion itself, one may assume that the court 
found no merit to this contention. 
 38. Pavlovich, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 911. 
 39. Points and Authorities, supra note 37. 
 40. Id. 
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Pavlovich posted the program on a Web site that he owned and 
operated, www.livid.on.openprojects.net.41  The Web site itself was a 
passive site and “did not involve the interactive exchange of information 
with users, did not solicit or engage in business activities, and did not 
solicit contact with California.”42  In short, all Pavlovich did was upload 
a program onto the Internet. 
It was this action that formed the basis for DVD CCA’s December 
1999 complaint.  According to the complaint, Pavlovich misappropriated 
trade secrets belonging to DVD CCA by republishing DeCSS on his 
Web site.43  In response to the complaint, Pavlovich moved to quash 
service of process on the grounds that the California court lacked 
personal jurisdiction.44  Specifically, Pavlovich argued that he did not 
have sufficient contacts with California to support the exercise of 
jurisdiction.45  The issue wound its way through the California court 
system46 and finally landed in the Sixth District Court of Appeal. 
 
 41. Pavlovich, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 912.  See discussion supra note 37. 
 42. Points and Authorities, supra note 37. 
 43. Pavlovich, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 911.  Note that this Casenote deals only with 
the issue of personal jurisdiction.  The merits, or lack thereof, of DVD CCA’s complaint 
are beyond the scope of this Casenote.  For more information on the law of trade secrets 
and the Internet, see generally Victoria A. Cundiff, Trade Secrets and the Internet: A 
Practical Perspective, COMPUTER LAW., Aug. 1997, at 6 (suggesting practical ways to 
avoid disclosure of trade secrets on the Internet and the legal consequences of 
disclosure); Ari B. Good, Trade Secrets and the New Realities of the Internet Age, 2 
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 51 (1998) (addressing trade secret law as it applies to the 
Internet); Ryan Lambrecht, Trade Secrets and the Internet: What Remedies Exist for 
Disclosure in the Information Age?, 18 REV. LITIG. 317 (1999) (discussing both 
equitable and legal remedies for disclosure of trade secrets on the Internet); David G. 
Majdali, Comment, Trade Secrets Versus the Internet: Can Trade Secret Protection 
Survive in the Internet Age?, 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 125 (2000) (examining how courts 
deal with dissemination of trade secrets on the Internet); Matthew R. Millikin, Note, 
www.misappropriation.com: Protecting Trade Secrets After Mass Dissemination on the 
Internet, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 931 (2000) (discussing trade secret protection and the 
Internet). 
 44. Pavlovich, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 911. 
 45. Id. 
 46. On June 6, 2000, Pavlovich filed a motion to quash service of process in the 
Santa Clara County Superior Court; the motion was denied.  Id. at 909, 911.  On 
September 11, 2000, Pavlovich filed a petition in the Sixth District Court of Appeal for a 
writ of mandate to compel the trial court to quash service of process due to lack of 
personal jurisdiction; the petition was denied.  Id.  On October 23, 2000, Pavlovich filed 
a petition with the California Supreme Court for review.  Id. at 911.  The Supreme Court 
granted review and transferred the case back to the Sixth District Court of Appeal with 
directions that the Court of Appeal vacate its denial and direct the superior court to show 
cause why the relief sought in the petition should not be granted.  Id. 
The high court’s decision order was met with approval and described by some as a 
“victory for civil liberties on the Net.”  Electronic Frontier Found., Supreme Court 
Thwarts Hollywood’s War on Cyberspace, at http://www.virtualrecordings.com/ 
pavrelease.htm (Dec. 15, 2000).  Pavlovich’s attorney, Allonn Levy, stated that the 
decision “re-affirmed the principle that you don’t lose your [c]onstitutional due process 
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B.  The Holding 
After months of being bounced around the California courts, Matthew 
Pavlovich’s motion to quash found itself before the Sixth District Court 
of Appeal.47  Noting the reach of California’s long-arm statute, the court 
held that, despite “Pavlovich’s lack of physical and personal presence in 
California,”48 exercise of jurisdiction was constitutional.  The court 
reasoned that Pavlovich knew that California was the home of the movie 
industry and a technology “hot spot.”49  As a result of that knowledge, 
Pavlovich knew, or should have known, that his activities—republishing 
a program meant to decrypt DVD CCA’s DeCSS—“while benefiting 
him, were injuriously affecting the motion picture and computer 
industries in California.”50 According to the court, this knowledge 
provided a sufficient showing of “purposeful availment.”  Furthermore, 
the court found that exercise of jurisdiction over Pavlovich was not 
unreasonable.51 
C.  Analysis 
As stated, the Sixth District Court of Appeal found the exercise of 
jurisdiction over Pavlovich constitutionally permissible.  While the court 
attempted to provide some rationale for its decision, its analysis is 
unpersuasive and, arguably, erroneous. 
 
rights when you enter cyberspace.”  Id. 
Pursuant to the supreme court’s order, the court of appeals vacated its order and 
directed the superior court to show cause why Pavlovich’s motion should not be granted.  
Pavlovich, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 911.  The opinion at issue in this Casenote is the result of 
that order.  The superior court’s role in formulating the response to that order was likely 
quite limited.  As the real party in interest, DVD CCA filed a return in opposition to the 
petition.  Id. 
Note that the California rules for appellate review differ substantially from the federal 
rules.  In federal court, a defendant may not seek immediate review of an order denying a 
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.  As a general rule, he must wait until 
the district court enters a final judgment.  This stems from the fact that the federal courts 
of appeal have “jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts.”  28 
U.S.C. § 1291 (2000).  On the other hand, in California a defendant may seek 
interlocutory appellate review.  See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 418.10(c) (West 2000 & 
Supp. 2002).  For more on California civil procedure, see WALTER W. HEISER ET AL., 
CALIFORNIA CIVIL PROCEDURE (1996). 
 47. Pavlovich, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 911. 
 48. Id. at 916. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 918. 
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Noting that the Internet is a new technology, the court stated that “the 
rules governing the protection of property rights, and how that protection 
may be enforced under the new technology, need not be.”52  According 
to the court, the United States Supreme Court provided “sufficient 
guidance”53 in Calder v. Jones.54 
In Calder, the Court upheld the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
despite the defendants’ apparent lack of contact with the forum state.55  
The case involved allegations of libel premised on an article that was 
written entirely in another state.  Analyzing the personal jurisdiction 
issue, the Court stated: 
In judging minimum contacts, a court properly focuses on ‘the relationship 
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’  The plaintiff’s lack of 
‘contacts’ will not defeat otherwise proper jurisdiction, but they may be so 
manifold as to permit jurisdiction when it would not exist in their absence.  
Here, the plaintiff is the focus of the activities of the defendants out of which the 
suit arises. 
 The allegedly libelous story concerned the California activities of a 
California resident.  It impugned the professionalism of an entertainer whose 
television career was centered in California.  The article was drawn from 
California sources, and the brunt of the harm, in terms both of respondent’s 
emotional distress and the injury to her professional reputation, was suffered in 
California.  In sum, California is the focal point both of the story and of the 
harm suffered.  Jurisdiction over petitioners is therefore proper in California 
based on the ‘effects’ of their Florida conduct in California.56 
The Pavlovich court’s reliance on Calder was misplaced.  Admittedly, 
Calder involved a factual situation that, at first blush, appears 
remarkably similar to the case at hand.  However, the court overlooked a 
crucial distinction—in Calder, the defendants had contacts with 
California that were separate and distinct from the harmful effects 
suffered by the plaintiff.57  For example, the reporter who wrote the 
 
 52. Id. at 912–13. 
 53. Id. 
 54. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).  It is interesting to note that the Pavlovich court began its 
opinion not by offering a traditional analysis of personal jurisdiction, but instead by 
attempting to analogize to a similar case where jurisdiction was found. 
 55. Id. at 789.  The case involved a suit for libel by Shirley Jones against a reporter 
and editor of the National Enquirer.  Id. at 784–86.  Jones alleged that she had been 
libeled in an article written and edited entirely in Florida.  See id. at 785–86.  The Court 
stated that despite the defendants’ lack of contacts with California, jurisdiction was 
“proper in California based on the ‘effects’ of their Florida conduct in California.”  Id. at 
789.  The Court went on to hold that jurisdiction was proper “because . . . [defendants’] 
intentional conduct in Florida [was] calculated to cause injury to respondent in 
California.”  Id. at 791.  This test has become known as the “Calder effects test.” 
 56. Id. at 788–89 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).  The 
Court went on to stress the fact that the plaintiff was the focus of the libel.  See id. at 
789–90. 
 57. See id. at 785–86.  For example, the reporter who wrote the article frequently 
traveled to California on business, called sources in California for information on Jones, 
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article frequently traveled to California on business, called sources in 
California for information regarding the plaintiff, and phoned the 
husband of the plaintiff in California to elicit his comments about the 
article prior to publication.58  And as the Court noted, “[t]he article was 
drawn from California sources.”59  One might argue that the wrongful 
act itself—the libel—was premised entirely on the contacts with those 
California sources.  In light of this, it is understandable that the Court 
found the exercise of jurisdiction permissible. 
In the case at hand, however, Pavlovich’s wrongful conduct was in no 
way premised on contacts with California.  In fact, Pavlovich had no 
contact whatsoever with California, other than that stemming from the 
harmful effects of his conduct.60 
Second, in Calder, the Court emphasized the fact that the defendants’ 
wrongful conduct was specifically “aimed” at the plaintiff herself, a 
California resident.  The Court acknowledged the importance of this 
factor when it stated that “the plaintiff is the focus of the activities of the 
defendants out of which the suit arises.”61  In the case at hand, Pavlovich’s 
conduct was not aimed at DVD CCA; in fact, he was allegedly unaware 
of the existence of DVD CCA,62 an obscure association formed by the 
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and two other 
somewhat obscure groups, the Business Software Alliance and the 
Electronic Industries Alliance.63 
Finally, the harmful effects in Calder were actually felt by the 
California plaintiff in California.  In the case at hand, the harmful effects 
to which the court alludes64 were felt not by DVD CCA, but by the 
motion picture and computer industries—two amorphous and ill-defined 
groups, as opposed to a specific, identifiable person as in Calder—that 
 
and phoned the husband of the plaintiff in California to elicit his comments about the 
article prior to publication.  Id.  As the Court noted, the article itself was drawn from 
California sources.  Id. at 788.  One may draw the conclusion that but for the defendants’ 
telephone conversations with sources in California, the article could not have been 
written.  See id. at 785. 
 58. Id. at 785–86. 
 59. Id. at 788. 
 60. See supra notes 38–42 and accompanying text. 
 61. Calder, 465 U.S. at 788. 
 62. Points and Authorities, supra note 37. 
 63. AOL Legal Dep’t, Decisions & Litigation: Intellectual Property: DVD Copy 
Control Association, Inc. v. McLaughlin, et al., at http://legal.web.aol.com/decisions/dlip 
/DVDCCA.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2002). 
 64. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
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were not even party to the suit.  In short, Pavlovich does not involve the 
same caliber of activities as those present in Calder. 
Perhaps realizing the inanity of its Calder analysis, the Pavlovich 
court seemed to abruptly shift gears in the middle of its opinion and 
focused on personal jurisdiction analysis.  The court began by noting the 
breadth of the California long-arm statute, and by acknowledging that 
due process requires minimum contacts and reasonableness.65  According to 
the court, where a court seeks to exercise specific jurisdiction, minimum 
contacts are satisfied where the defendant purposefully avails himself of 
forum benefits and where the suit is related to or arises out of the 
contacts.66  Admittedly, it is difficult to find fault with the analytic 
structure set forth by the court.67  What is problematic is the way in 
which the court used that structure to reach its conclusion. 
Perhaps what is most disturbing about the case is the court’s 
willingness to find purposeful availment.  Presumably, the court based 
its finding on the effects test of Calder.68  Citing a Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals case, Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen,69 the court 
stated that “the ‘purposeful availment’ requirement is satisfied where a 
 
 65. See Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 913 (Ct. App. 2001). 
 66. Id. 
 67. As previously stated, exercise of specific jurisdiction is permissible where the 
following three requirements are met: (1) the defendant must have purposefully directed 
his activities at the forum or purposefully availed himself of the privilege of doing 
business in the forum, (2) the suit must arise out of or relate to those activities, and (3) 
the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.  See supra notes 21–30 and 
accompanying text.  Thus, in the case at hand, California’s exercise of jurisdiction is 
permissible: (1) if Matthew Pavlovich purposefully directed his activities at California, 
(2) if the cause of action arose out of or is related to his contacts with California, and (3) 
if exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. 
 68. While one might presume that the court is relying on the effects test, it never 
states that it is doing so and does not cite Calder.  See Pavlovich, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 909. 
 69. 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).  In Panavision, the plaintiff, owner of the 
trademarks to “Panavision” and “Panaflex,” sued Toeppen, a resident of Illinois, for 
trademark infringement for using the names “Panavision.com” and “Panaflex.com” as 
Web addresses.  See id. at 1319.  When Panavision protested to Toeppen, he offered to 
stop using the names if Panavision would pay him $13,000.  Id.  Panavision refused and 
brought suit in a federal district court in California.  Id.  Toeppen objected to jurisdiction.  
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that jurisdiction was permissible and stated: 
Under Calder, personal jurisdiction can be based upon, ‘(1) intentional actions 
(2) expressly aimed at the forum state (3) causing harm, the brunt of which is 
suffered—and which the defendant knows is likely to be suffered—in the 
forum state.’ 
  . . . Toeppen purposefully registered Panavision’s trademarks as his 
domain names on the Internet to force Panavision to pay him money.  The 
brunt of the harm to Panavision was felt in California.  Toeppen knew 
Panavision would likely suffer harm there because . . . its principal place of 
business was in California, and the heart of the theatrical motion picture and 
television industry is located there. 
Id. at 1321 (citations omitted). 
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defendant’s intentional conduct causes harmful effects within the 
state.”70  The Pavlovich court not only incorrectly construed Panavision,71 
but also erroneously applied the Calder effects test. 
The court myopically focused entirely on Pavlovich’s “intentional” 
conduct, and the harmful effects stemming from it.  However, even if 
one were to concede that Pavlovich’s conduct was indeed intentional and 
that it did indeed cause harm within California, the exercise of 
jurisdiction is still impermissible.  Merely causing an effect within the 
forum state does not, on its own, satisfy purposeful availment.72 
Both Calder and Panavision recognize that, in addition to causing an 
effect, the defendant must also have aimed his contacts at the forum 
state.73  The Pavlovich court did not address this factor.  If the court 
were to do so, it might have to concede that Pavlovich never expressly 
aimed his conduct at the forum and that, consequently, there was no 
purposeful availment.  As previously stated, Pavlovich did not aim his 
conduct at DVD CCA; all he did was upload DeCSS to the Internet.  As 
recognized by the Ninth Circuit in Panavision, simply putting something 
on the Internet is not sufficient to subject a nonresident defendant to suit 
in the forum.74  “There must be ‘something more’ to demonstrate that the 
defendant directed his activity toward the forum state.”75  In the case at 
hand, the “something more” is simply missing. 
Indeed, under the Pavlovich court’s formulation, California could 
exercise jurisdiction over anyone, anywhere, who posted something on 
 
 70. Pavlovich, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 916 (citing Panavision Int’l, L.P., 141 F.3d 
1316 at 1321). 
 71. The court in Panavision stated that “under Calder, personal jurisdiction can be 
based upon: ‘(1) intentional actions (2) expressly aimed at the forum state (3) causing 
harm, the brunt of which is suffered—and which the defendant knows is likely to be 
suffered—in the forum state.’”  Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1321 (quoting Core-Vent Corp. 
v. Novel Indus. AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1486 (9th Cir. 1993)).  The court in Pavlovich 
seemingly ignores Calder’s second criteria: that actions be “expressly aimed” at the forum. 
 72. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984) (stating that “the mere fact that 
[the defendants] can ‘foresee’ that the article will . . . have an effect in California is not 
sufficient for an assertion of jurisdiction” and noting that the “intentional, and allegedly 
tortious, actions [of the defendants] were expressly aimed at California”); GTE New 
Media Servs. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1349–50 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (refusing to 
exercise jurisdiction where defendant did not expressly aim his activities at the forum 
state); Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1321; Edmunds v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 281, 
287 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding that merely causing an effect “is not necessarily sufficient 
to afford a constitutional basis for jurisdiction”). 
 73. See supra notes 59, 67–69 and accompanying text. 
 74. See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1322. 
 75. Id. (quoting Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
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the Internet, provided that they had some vague notion that harmful 
effects would be caused in California.  For example, an Internet user in 
Timbuktu posting a defamatory remark about a movie actor on a bulletin 
board might be haled into a California court and required to defend 
against a defamation of character suit.  Surely, this kind of limitless 
jurisdictional power was not and has never been envisioned by the 
Supreme Court as valid. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
As the Internet becomes more pervasive, issues of personal 
jurisdiction will have to be addressed.  As this case illustrates, a 
defendant using the Internet may have no contact whatsoever with the 
forum state, other than the impact of his behavior, yet may still be 
required to defend a suit there.  Courts may be tempted to circumvent the 
requirement of minimum contacts in order to protect the rights of 
residents.  This case presents an opportunity for the California Supreme 





 76. On December 12, 2001 the California Supreme Court granted review of the Sixth 
District Court of Appeal’s decision.  Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 36 P.3d 625 (Cal. 2001). 
